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INTERPRETATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
COMPACTS ALLOCATING INTERSTATE STREAMS
I. Introduction: Interstate compacts generally
A. History of interstate compacts
1. Compacts before 1789; origin of Compact Clause.
2. Expansion of the use of compacts.
3. Compacts for allocation of water of interstate streams.
B. Structure of compacts.
1. Federal consent.
2. Administrative agencies created by compacts.
3. Compacts for allocation of waters of interstate streams
II. Constitutional and federalism problems of compacts.
A. Generally.






1. Doctrine of equitable apportionment.
2. Congressional preemption.
3. Judicial supervision.
a. Suits between states.
b. Federal question or federal law: certiorari.
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III. Administrative mechanism created by water allocation compacts, .,■'
A. Description and classification.
B. Operation.
1. Budgets.
2. Engineering and techincal committees*
3. Voting procedures.
C. Federal government role.
D. Litigation.
IV. The "law" of interstate water compacts.
A. Supremacy Clause.




D. Enforcement after interpretation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper is concerned only
with interstate compacts which appor
tion or govern the consumptive use of
waters of interstate streams. The
compacts considered under this heading
are listed and described in the Appen
dix. Interstate water compacts can
and should be distinguished from other
types of interstate compacts, the var
iety and scope of which is amply set
forth in the Council of State Govern
ments publication on "Interstate
Compacts and Agencies, 197 9." Also,
see Muys, Interstate Water Compacts,
Legal Study for National Water Com
mission, NTIS, 1971. The key distinc
tion between interstate water compacts
and other compacts is that the latter
effectuate the Supreme Court's doc
trine of equitable apportionment.
Hinderlider v. La Plata and Cherry
Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
It is my conclusion that the
interstate water compact has had its
N-l
day in the sun; the compact approach
to the resolution of problems of ap
portionment of interstate streams will
survive, if it does, as a gesture of
goodwill by a dominating federal gov
ernment. Where it is in the federal
government's interest, it may encour
age compacts, but Congressional con
sent in the recent past has only been
given when detailed provisions protec
ting present and possible federal in
terests are included in the compacts.
II. HISTORY OF INTERSTATE WATER
COMPACTS
The history of interstate
compacts was both written and influ
enced by Felix Frankfurter while
Professor of Law at Harvard. He and
James M. Landis published an encyclo
pedic and scholarly treatment of com
pacts from colonial times. [Frank
furter, F. and James M. Landis, "The
Compact Clause of the Constitution—A
Study in Interstate Adjustments," 34 ^
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Yale Law J. 684 (1925).] The article
espoused the "Giant Power" scheme
which was pushed at the time by Gov
ernor Gifford Pinchot of Pennsyl
vania. The idea was to couple
"engineering schemes for private
development with a demand for a
comprehensive legal control over
rates, services, finances, construc
tion and interconnections." The in
terstate compact was seen as a way to
push the idea along, federal legisla
tion as well as independent state
action being regarded as impractical.
"The vehicle for this process of legal
adjustment is at hand in the fruitful
possibilities inherent in the Compact
Clause of the Constitution."
The polemic aspect of the
article may be explained in The
Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection, by
Bruce Allen Murphy, (Oxford, 1982).
The Murphy book details how Justice
Brandeis financed the production of a
number of Frankfurter's professional
publications, and how he also contrib-
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uted to the support of graduate re- ^
search fellows working with Frank
furter, starting with James M, Landis.
Brandeis cited the interstate compact
article in his dissent in DiSanto v.
Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, (1927)
which struck down a state law requir
ing licensing of people who sold
steamboat tickets, and in Hinderlider
which he wrote for a unanimous court.
The Frankfurter-Landis arti
cle, whether or not Justice Brandeis
subsidized it, foresaw an increasing
use of compacts for the resolution of
interstate natural resource problems
as mechanisms between federal pre
emption and independent state action
which could solve the federalism
problem presented. They were par
ticularly impressed with the Colorado
River Compact, negotiated three years
earlier, and not yet (or ever) fully
ratified. They wrote:
The Colorado
River is the Nile
for the Southwest;
the State of Colo
rado its Soudan. ^
At first there was
N-4
-^ no collision among













draw freely on the
available surplus.
But when, in course
of time, the United
States proposed
enormous projects
on the public do
main within this
basin, and when the
abutting States
planned further













































ted to the inter
ests of a region of
States immediately
affected.
The vision which Frankfurter
and Landis {and perhaps Brandeis) had
about the role of compacts as a mech
anism for regionalism in our federal
system has been realized most com
pletely in the compact which created
the New York Port Authority [New York
New Jersey Port Authority Compact, 42
Stat. 174 (1921)]. Regional electric
energy systems came about through
federal instrumentalities, the
Tennessee Valley Authority and the
Bonneville Power Administration.
Because the scholarship of
the article was directed toward the
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^ political goal of "Giant Power,"
little attention was given to the
possibility that water compacts might
derive from the judicial rather than
the legislative article of the Con
stitution. However, the divergent
lines of authority are delineated in
the discussion of the history of the
clause. The Compact Clause was di
rectly based upon a provision of the
Articles of Confederation which made
Congress the final authority on the
quite common disputes between the
colonies and the States under the
Confederation about boundaries. In
colonial times some of these contro
versies went directly to the Crown,
which generally appointed a Royal
Commission. Others went to the Privy
Council as cases. In either case, it
was obvious when the Articles of
Confederation and later the Consti
tution were drafted that a national-
level mechanism for resolution of
boundary disputes had to be provided.
f^ Under the Articles of Confederation,
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Article IX, there was an appeal to
Congress "in all disputes and differ
ences now subsisting or that hereafter
may arise between two or more states
concerning boundary/ jurisdiction or
any cause whatever. . •"
This was separate from Arti
cle VI of the Articles of Confedera
tion/ the direct antecedent of Article








































which the same is
to be entered in






. . . enter into
any Agreement or
Compact with an
other or with a
foreign power . .
(Art. 1, sec. 10,
cl. 3).
/)
When the Constitution was
drafted, the provision for appeal to
Congress became a part of the commerce
clause while the colonial-era appeal
N-9
to the Privy Council was reflected in ^_
the judicial clause, according to
Frankfurter and Landis. It appears,
therefore, that the boundary cases,
and compacts concerning them, may come
under both Article III and under the
Commerce clause, even though some
cases suggest, without deciding, that
the Compact Clause defines Congress's
power.
III. STRUCTURE OF COMPACTS
The Appendix reveals that
interstate water compacts have become
fairly standard in structure. All of
the recent compacts create an adminis
trative agency, or Compact Commission.
The administrative agency is custom
arily given the power to make rules
for the effectuation of the provisions
of the compact, and is assigned the
duty to determine or monitor physical
circumstances such as the flow of the
river at various points, in order to
determine when allocational provisions ^
N-10
jm^ of the compact are triggered. Each
state has one vote but it is usual for
several members to be appointed for
each state. The Governor of the state
usually appoints members to serve at
his pleasure, although it is also
quite common for compacts to specify
that members named should be from
constituencies or geographical areas.
There is always a federal member, who
usually presides, but seldom has his
own vote. In the Snake River Compact,
the federal member can vote to resolve
impasse and in the Upper Colorado
River Compact the federal number can
vote to make the needed fourth vote,
four votes being necessary out of the
five commission members, one from each
state and one from the federal govern
ment. In four compacts, there is
provision for impasse to be resolved
by arbitration; usually, however, the
requirement of unanimity builds in the
possibility of impasse.
Compacts sometimes contain an
{** operation manual for the river. In
N-ll
the Pecos River Compact, an operating
manual was incorporated by reference,
but provision was made for its
modification by the compact agency.
The protection of federal
interests has become more explicit and
more pointed. [The federal government
is a compact member under the Delaware
River Basin Compact (75 Stat. 688) but
this is a special case. Early in the
Kennedy administration, as Assistant
Secretary of the Interior, I helped
get the President to overrule the
objections of the Bureau of the '
Budget. No executive agency since
then has been similarly successful.]
In the Truman administration,
the federal representative to the
negotiations on the Snake River Com
pact was reminded by the President
himself that he should be especially
mindful of federal prerogatives, lest
it become necessary to veto consent
legislation. Documents on the Use and
Control of the Waters of Interstate
and International Streams, T.R. Witmer, ^
N-12
f^ ed., House Document No. 319, GPO,
(1968), pp. 309-311.
Where a Commission is estab
lished, it is usual for its budget to
be supplied by the States, and few
problems seem to have arisen in this
aspect of compact administration.
Commissions hire their own staff, and
there seems to have been a minimum of
friction in the handling of fussy
matters such as civil service hiring
requirements, compensation levels, and
the like. Similarly, engineering and
technical committees are created,
usually by calling upon the technical
agencies of the member states to fur
nish the necessary personnel.
Questions have from time to
time arisen as to the proper character
ization of these compact-created admin
istrative agencies. They seem to be
sui generis; certainly they are not
agencies of the federal government
within the meaning of the Administra
tive Procedure Act. The Supreme Court
\ in Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe
N-.13
Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391,
treats the compact-created agency as a
political subdivision of the states,
legislative in nature, for the dual
purposes of its conduct being "under
color of state law" within the meaning
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Civil Rights
Act of 1971, and for conferring abso
lute immunity from federal damages for
its members. Other cases have re
ferred to the agency as a public cor
porate instrumentality of the two
states [Delaware River Joint Toll
Bridge Commission v. Colburn, 310 U.S.
419 (1940)] and as a joint or common
agency of the states [Petty v.
Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commission,
359 U.S. 275 (1959).] The argument
that a compact is a "federal law" de
veloped inconsistently with what had
been said in Hinderlider, and the cases
are discussed in Cuyler v. Adams, 449
U.S. 433, (1981). For an earlier anal
ysis, see Comment, "Federal Question
Jurisdiction to Interpret Interstate




IV. JUDICIAL SUPERVISION OF WATER
COMPACTS
Courts have had trouble with
compacts, with the administrative agen
cies created by compacts, and with the
theories supporting their own juris-
dic- tion over compact controversies.
Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503,
and other cases discussed by David
Engdahl in his article "Character
ization of Interstate Arrangements:
When Is a Compact Not a Compact?" 6 4
Mich. L. Rev. 63 (1965) develop the
interesting but anachronistic idea
that compacts are organic, as resist
ant to change as constitutions. The
Port Authority of New York claimed
that compact agency officials were
immune from Congressional subpoena.
Comment, "Congressional Supervision of
Interstate Compacts", 75 Yale Law J.
1416 (1966); United States v. Tobin,
195 F. Supp. 588; rev'd 306 F. 2d 270;
cert, den. 371 U. S. 902 (1962). It
appears that compact agencies have the
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ability to bootstrap themselves into
activities not explicit in the compact
document by the exercise of rulemaking
powers granted to them. (Ibid.) When
they are based on equitable apportion
ment, compact provisions control over
rights to water adjudicated under
state law. (Hinderlider). As to
water allocation compacts, it may
confidently be said that only the
Supreme Court may review them, al
though whether this is because they
are federal laws or because they
present federal questions is not
wholly clear.
It is my opinion that because
interstate water compacts rest upon
the doctrine of equitable apportion
ment, disputes about their meaning
will not be resolved under contract
law principles. The legislative
history of compacts, and their meaning
when adopted, would not control courts
of equity. Since the Supreme Court
sits as a court of equity in ruling
upon compacts resting upon equitable m.
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^ apportionment, it is conceivable, even
probable, that it could reach a dif-'
ferent result than it might if acting
as a court of law. The water appor
tionment cases not based on compacts
tell us that the court looks to what
happens in the future, not what has
happened in the past. [Colorado v.
Kansas, 320 U.S. 383 (1943)]. In
Wyoming v. Colorado, 353 U.S. 953
(1957), the Supreme Court approved a
stipulated judgment at odds with its
own original decree. Other cases are
Washington v. Oregon, 296 U.S. 517
(1936), and Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325
U.S. 589 (1945).
It is my thesis that since
the Supreme Court has the responsi
bility for equitable apportionment of
streams, a kind of Gresham's law of
compacts will cause the Supreme Court
to avoid the detail of the meaning of
compact language, and associated
questions of liability for their
breach. It will instead send the
f^ parties back to the bargaining table
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to come up with a settlement which the
court can test against the standard of
contemporaneous "equity," not a stan
dard of equity as of the date of the
original compact.
If the Supreme Court bases a
new decree equitably apportioning a
stream on an agreement reached by the
parties in the course of the litiga
tion, would such an agreement require
Congressional consent under terms of
the Compact Clause? Or, a corollary
question, could Congress alter an
equitable apportionment decree ren- "
dered by the Supreme Court based upon
agreement between the States involved,
as readily as it could alter a compact
to which it had granted consent?
There is no evidence of any
inclination on the part of Congress to
intrude itself into the process where
by states settle their lawsuits in the
Supreme Court. Obviously such a pro
cess could not affect the rights of
the United States, except as the
United States as a party might agree ^
N-18
to the stipulated judgment, but this
begs the question of whether the
Constitution's mandate for Congres
sional consent controls over the
Court's power to resolve controversies
under its original jurisdiction.
No authority that I have
found helps with the question of
whether there is any comparative
constraint upon Congress's power to
preempt under the Commerce Clause. I
think there is none.
The interstate water compact
' now being actively litigated between
Texas and New Mexico concerning the
Pecos River, Texas v. New Mexico, No.
65 Original, is one I cannot discuss
very specifically because I have
agreed to assist the Special Master in
that case. New Mexico is also in
volved in the only other active equi
table apportionment water case on the
Supreme Court's docket, Colorado v.
New Mexico, No. 80 Original. In that
case, Federal Judge Ewing Kerr of
sgm± Wyoming, as Special Master, has filed
N-19
a report suggesting that Colorado is
entitled to 4,000 acre feet of the
waters of the headwater tributaries of
the Vermejo River for a transbasin
diversion project, over the vigorous
objections of New Mexico.
The Rocky Mountain News on
May 14th reported that Kansas is
seriously considering suing Colorado
on the Arkansas River Compact of 1948,
which was designed to set at rest the
controversy which precipitated the
enunciation of the equitable appor-
tionment doctrine, Kansas v. Colorado,
206 U.S. 46 (1907) .
These cases will further test
the efficacy and continuing utility of
compacts. If my thesis is correct,
the situation of the states in a suit
on the compact will not materially
differ from the situation which would
exist if there were no compact at all.
I think that the model for
the future is not the compact, but the
stipulated agreement, like those which
now control the Gila between New **t
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^m. Mexico and Arizona, (Arizona v.
California, 373 U.S. 546) the North
Platte, among Nebraska, Wyoming and
Colorado, (Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325
U.S. 589) the Laramie, between Wyoming
and Colorado, (Wyoming v. Colorado,
353 U.S. 953) and (in riparian states)
the Connecticut between Massachusetts
and Connecticut, (Connecticut v.
Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660).
V. CONGRESSIONAL SUPERVISION OF
COMPACTS: PREEMPTION
We know from Arizona v.
California that Congress and the
Supreme Court play the children's
checker game of giveaway when it comes
to the responsibility for refereeing
disputes between states as to the
allocation of interstate streams
except where a federal program or
trust interest is involved. Obviously
the Supreme Court was satisfied that
Congress gave the Secretary of the
Interior this role when it passed the
N-21
Boulder Canyon Project Act, but all of
us who were observers of the scene
during the years when Carl Hayden
represented Arizona and Clair Engle
and Bizz Johnson and some powerful
predecessors represented California,
know that the one thing these Con
gressional leaders would all have
agreed upon was that the Secretary of
the Interior was not the one to run
the river.
So far, we have no situation
where an equitable apportionment
achieved by compact has been modified
(as to non-federal interests) by Con
gress. As noted earlier, Congress
occasionally insists that a compact
state explicitly that it may be
modified by Congress.
Doubts in this subject are
expressed by David Engdahl, whose
legal scholarship about the rights of
the States make him a latter day John
C. Calhoun. In his 1965 article in
the Virginia Law Review, (31 Virg. L.
Rev. 987) he devotes exhaustive atten-
N-22
tion to an analysis of the basis of
the Supreme Court jurisdiction in com
pact cases not between states. In
Hinderlider, the suit was between the
Colorado State Engineer and the Colo
rado Ditch Company; in West Virginia
ex rel Dyer v. Sims, the suit was also
between two citizens of West Virginia.
What was the basis of the Supreme
Court dismissing the appeal in
Hinderlider and reversing upon grant
ing certiorari on its own motion?
What is the basis of statutory
certiorari jurisdiction in Dyer v.
Sims? Is a compact a law of the
union, and if so how does it get to be
such if consent isn't given, or if
consent is given in advance? Does a
compact raise a federal question? Or
a constitutional question? Or a new
species of "interstate question"?
As intriguing as these
questions are, they do not go to the
question of what Congress may do, and
the Constitutional basis to be in-
f**> voked, when it wants to change the
N-2 3
arrangements states have agreed on by
compact. Nor do they answer the ques- ^
tion of whether, as to water compacts
which have already received Supreme
Court attention, and found to satisfy
the doctrine of equitable apportion
ment, the Congress may impose a
different regime on the parties.
Frankfurter and Landis have
no doubts: the Commerce Power clearly
is the basis for plenary Congressional
power, and I am inclined to agree.
The question is largely academic,
however, because the States, whatever
the scope or depth of their disagree
ment about the allocation of the
river, would almost certainly oppose
referring the matter to Congress in
the manner of the Articles of Confed
eration. They clearly would prefer to
have a judicial referee.
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
The combination of two ideas
discussed earlier — the compacts for
N-24
the allocation of waters of interstate
streams have to be interpreted to
match a contemporaneous standard of
equitable apportionment, and that the
Supreme Court will not look very far
behind any agreement the parties reach
— suggests some ways out of some
problems which have been identified as
lurking in existing compacts.
Some of these problems are:
a. The breakdown of
administration, much as that in the
Pecos River compact agency.
f^ b. The question of
whether the White River is apportioned
by the Colorado River Compact of 1948
or the earlier Compact of 1922.
c. Overlapping of
compacts, that is mention of the same
drainage in different compacts. The
Animas-LaPlata Project Compact, for
example, appears to amend the Upper
Colorado River Compact as it relates
to the Animas and La Plata Rivers.
In all of these situations,
genuine controversies between states
N-2 5
are incapable of resolution without a
supervening imprimatur from either the
Congress of the United States or the
Supreme Court of the United States.
There must either be a new or amended
compact/ requiring Congressional as
sent, or the resolution of disputes
about the coverage or interpretation
of an existing compact, requiring
Supreme Court approval. Or, under the
Commerce Clause, Congress must preempt
the field and impose its own solution.
If we assume, as I do, that
the last solution is politically un
desirable, and that the first solution
is impractical because the federal
consent will make it a federal pre
emptive solution, then a way must be
found to facilitate the Supreme Court
in handling of the cases to come
before it (or which are presently
pending) to establish a basis for
Supreme Court approval of an agreement
between the states which does not
require Congressional consent.
N-26
Where impasse exists, my
hypothesis is testable. It would be
possible for the Court to decide that
it need not enforce any language of
the compact inconsistent with equi
table apportionment; that the Court
has the equitable power to resolve
impasse simply because impasse cannot
be equitable and that therefore a tie-
breaking procedure can be ordered
pending final resolution; and that
since agreement between the parties is
a preferred method of resolving equi
table apportionment, the tie-breaking
machinery will end when agreement is
reached and judicially approved.
How the White River problem
could be solved is a different prob
lem, because it may not be as clear
that a case or controversy exists.
Assuming that hurdle is jumped, and it
might be in the case of the White be
cause of the activities of the Fish
and Wildlife Service of the Department
of the Interior in apportioning the
river on a de facto basis, thus laying
r
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the predicate for a suit by one state
against the federal government and the
second state, then my theories which
postulate that interstate water com
pacts look to the judicial clause and
the doctrine of equitable apportion
ment would furnish the basis for an
argument that the Colorado River Com
pacts could be reformed to speak to
the White River, again by an interim
order for the administration of the
stream pending an agreement between
the states meeting judicial approba-
tion. (See, generally, Balcomb, K.
"The White River Problem — Have Its
Waters Been Apportioned?" Paper
delivered for the Water Law Section,
Colorado Bar Association, April 2,
1982, Colorado Slrings, Colorado.)
The same approach would serve
for the question of the amendatory
effect of one compact over another, as
in the case of the Animas-La Plata
Project Compact.
I also think it possible to
revise the Judicial Code to relieve >«*
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the Supreme Court of some of its re
sponsibilities as a court of original
jurisdiction in suits between states.
Congress might provide general legis
lation concerning compacts under the
Commerce Clause, in place of the case-
by-case approach it now follows in
granting consent to specified compacts
under the Compact Clause. Such a
measure could specify the subject,
terms, and federal role in general
language, and, most importantly, could
provide that disputes concerning such
compacts entered into in accordance
with such legislation would be within
the jurisdiction of the federal courts
at the district or court of appeals
level with certiorari jurisdiction as
the method of Supreme Court review.
It is difficult for me to
imagine that the Supreme Court would
be able to find many practical objec
tions to the removal of the trouble
some water compact cases from their
original docket.
N-29
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